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Several analysts have suggested that the paranoid junta is fearful that an international relief effort could threaten its grip on power. The junta, they believe, suspects the hidden political agendas (perceived or real) of aid agencies and their Western government allies, especially the United States. The Tatmadaw's fear of a Western plot to topple it, however ludicrous, would make sense if we considered the military leadership's belief system. That system consists of four traits: ultra-nationalism, paranoia, belief in self-reliance and ethnocentrism. Myanmar's military leaders have long perceived it as their duty to protect the country's independence and territorial integrity, and to maintain total control of society. They seek to counter any external penetration, not only of the country's political and economic systems, but also of its social and cultural spheres. To understand this ultra-nationalism, it is necessary to consider the role of foreigners in the country's history. For almost 1,000 years, before the British annexed then-Burma in the 19th century, the area comprising present-day Myanmar was a distinct, coherent and autonomous entity. Burman kingdoms were hidden away from the world by impenetrable mountain ranges and jungles. The kings built thriving centres of learning in Pagan and Mandalay and ruled over a rich and prosperous civilisation. No wonder then that the elite became deeply humiliated by the political disenfranchisement, economic exploitation and social discrimination that British colonial rule inflicted on the country. The military's nationalist response to this humiliation took the form of conservatism (preference for tradition over modernity), insularity (lack of interest and contact with foreigners and their ideas) as well as exclusiveness (reluctance to admit new members into Myanmar society). The regime's aim was to restore Myanmar's 'Golden Age', where the country would again be for the Myanmar people. Myanmar's withdrawal from the world since the 1960s was an attempt by its military leaders to take control of their own destiny and protect Burmese sovereignty and national identity. Over time, this mindset became self-reinforcing as military officials became increasingly alienated from and uncomfortable with foreigners. Few of the country's top military officials today have significant international experience. Most were educated at home, speak little English, and rarely venture abroad. They lack understanding of contemporary international politics and feel out of place on the world stage. Their paranoid thinking is evident in their frequent claim that Western powers are trying to destabilise the country. General Than Shwe, chairman of the State Peace and Development Council since 1992, said in a 2001 interview that Western powers 'want to dominate and manipulate Myanmar'. Self-reliance is another long-standing feature of the military's thinking. This is best encapsulated in its oft-repeated slogan: 'The strength of the nation lies within.' Since the 1960s, the Tatma- daw has insisted that Myanmar should do things by itself. Former ruler Ne Win is said to have asserted that 'all of Burma's problems could be solved if the country were chiselled free of its Asian neighbours and floated out into the middle of the Bay of Bengal'. The final trait that explains the leadership's aversion to foreign assistance is its ethnocentric outlook. The Tatma- daw perceives Myanmar's problems to be not only unique, but also incomprehensible to outsiders. The generals believe there is a distinct Myanmar way of doing things. Ne Win's 'Burmese Way to Socialism', a mixture of Buddhist and socialist concepts, as well as the 1988 home-grown ideology of 'disciplined democracy' are examples of this conviction. These nationalist concepts are a significant source of pride for the junta. The flip side, however, is an acute lack of understanding of foreign affairs and the motivations and values of other countries. These traits form an inter- related and largely self-reinforcing belief system for the Tatmadaw. The junta's core beliefs exist independently of their political usefulness and despite their obvious negative consequences. The leaders' views of the outside world, especially, have proven to be remarkably resistant to change. The Tatmadaw today stands largely alone in the world as much by choice as by necessity. There is no doubt the international community now has a critical role to play in ensuring that humanitarian assistance is delivered to cyclone survivors. But forcing the military leadership to open its doors to allow greater international assistance could be counter-productive. Compelling the regime to open its doors runs the risk of a nationalistic backlash, and could lead to a complete shutting of the borders. As a senior Myanmar military leader warned in 1998: 'Myanmar will neither succumb to the lure of carrots nor be cowered by the threat of sticks...Our mentality is not to give in to any pressure. If there is pressure put upon us, we become more resistant...' Change can only come from within the Tatmadaw. The military, with its self-professed role of protecting Myanmar, must now open up and invite foreign assistance in order to save its people.
The writer is an assistant professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.
DOING IT THEIR WAY
The Tatmadaw perceives Myanmar's problems to be not only unique, but also essentially incomprehensible to outsiders.
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