by Robert Karniol, Defence Writer

CONTRARY to the assumption of most international observers, Manila sees the Communist Party of the Philippines/ New People's Army (CPP/ NPA) as a greater threat than the Muslim secessionist movements that have long unsettled the country's southern region.

'The (Muslim secessionist) Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has about 11,000 armed personnel but they are isolated in certain parts of Mindanao (and adjacent areas). The CPP/NPA has an armed strength of some 5,300 but these are deployed nationwide. It comes down to the number of affected barangays (districts) scattered throughout the country,' said Lieutenant-Colonel Ernesto Torres, the Armed Forces of the Philippines spokesman.

The CPP/NPA is thought to now exert some degree of influence over 1,470 barangays, compared with 1,919 last year. At the movement's peak in the mid-1980s, there were some 8,000 affected barangays among roughly 40,000 nationwide.

The CPP/NPA is a Maoist-leaning movement that was launched in early 1969. It reached its greatest strength of some 25,000 armed combatants in the mid-1980s. The group's popular support dwindled amid the optimism generated by the 'people power' revolt that overthrew then-president Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, but its insurgency persisted.

This stubborn problem is partly rooted in the social and economic inequities that haunt the Philippines, partly in the entrenched lawlessness that remains prevalent in many outlying areas. The CPP/NPA appears less willing than the MILF to explore a political solution.

A peace process involving the MILF is currently in limbo after the Supreme Court of the Philippines in August this year rejected an agreement that may have ended the conflict. Talks between the government and the CPP/NPA, with the latter represented by an umbrella group called the National Democratic Front, show less progress.

Norway has served as the facilitator of the process with CPP/NPA since 2001. Preliminary meetings held in Oslo in October 2003 led to a resumption of talks in February the following year and a second round in March but the dialogue was again suspended by the CPP/NPA in August 2004.

An exploratory meeting aimed at reviving this effort took place in Oslo last month and quickly collapsed. In any case, the talks have never progressed beyond technical points to issues of political substance. This has left both sides with only the military option.

Lt-Col Torres said the Philippine army is pursuing a 'clear, hold and support' strategy to counter the communists. The military is deployed to clear insurgents from affected areas, and paramilitary elements known as Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units are then established to consolidate the government's foothold.

The next stage, aimed at addressing the root causes of insurgency, involves development projects.

This approach reflects classic counter-insurgency doctrine and was bolstered last year with the Philippine army's creation of a National Development Support Command (NDSC) to oversee non-military operations. The NDSC controls the development budget, including funds for the construction of schools and artesian wells, together with humanitarian programmes like medical missions.

The aim, a Manila-based analyst told The Straits Times, is to address fundamental issues. This includes forging the army into an effective force and promoting development. The latter is being supplemented by fiscal reforms, including the introduction of a value-added tax, together with efforts to address chronic shortcomings in law enforcement and the judiciary.

'It's a long-term process but the government has had some real success through both hard and soft power,' the analyst said. The efforts enjoy some foreign support, though funding remains the key constraint.

The funding issue is epitomised by the army's force modernisation programme, first outlined in 1986 and yet to reach second gear. Initially intended to re-focus the armed forces on external defence, the programme was ultimately scaled down, with internal security re-prioritised. 'There has been progress over the past four years,' the analyst offered.

Tactical and strategic planning was further muddled under then-president Joseph Estrada, when the lead in counter-insurgency was handed to the Philippine National Police with the army assigned to simple support for all but five areas of the country. This strategy was introduced in January 1996 and rescinded in late 1998, when the army was again placed in the forefront.

President Gloria Arroyo vowed in 2006 to crush the CPP/NPA insurgency by the time her term ends in 2010, and the army remains confident of achieving this goal. 'We are still optimistic that the CPP/NPA insurgency can be reduced to an inconsequential level by 2010, and that it could then be managed by the Philippine National Police,' said Lt-Col Torres. But the analyst said 'there is no way to predict what might happen in a set timeframe'.

The CPP/NPA doubtless holds a different view. It would surely have noted that Maoist insurgents earlier this year won power in Nepal, albeit through the ballot box.

rkarniol@sph.com.sg

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